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Abstract:
In an imperfectly competitive economy with direct and indirect taxes, the rst best
wage subsidy overcompensates workers and provides the incentive to misreport working
hours. We show that in the second best optimum where the government cannot use a wage
subsidy, the optimal policy is to tax labour income at a zero rate. This policy is optimal
because it minimizes the incentive to misreport working hours.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that in an imperfectly competitive economy the rst best tax policy
involves a lump sum tax and subsidies to the monopoly distorted returns to labour and
capital (e.g. Judd (1997), Guo and Lansing (1999)). We consider two restrictions on this
rst best outcome. We assume that lump sum taxes are not available, which motivates
the standard Ramsey (1927) problem. In addition, because wage subsidies are typically
associated with misreporting of working hours, we consider a Ramsey problem that does
not permit wage subsidy in the imperfectly competitive sector. We nd that with these
two restrictions, in a steady state and in the initial period, optimal labour income tax rate
in the imperfectly competitive sector is zero.
In an imperfectly competitive economy, prot seeking investment results in over accu-
mulation of capital and a suboptimal level of working hours. In order to push the private
return to factors up to their socially optimal level, the best policy should be one that
subsidizes the returns to these factors. This is one of the key ndings of both Judd (1997)
and Guo and Lansing (1999). However, if the government has a consumption tax in the
scheme, the rst best tax policy (which involves a subsidy to the monopoly distorted pri-
vate returns to factors) overcompensates workers, which in turns leads to misreporting of
working hours.
Typically, the disincentive e¤ect of a wage subsidy is stronger if the government uses
a consumption tax. This is because generally government spending is large relative to
the di¤erence between consumption and wage income. Expressed as a share of GDP, the
average di¤erence between consumption and wage income in the US is approximately 0.14,
while average government expenditures share in GDP is approximately 0.232. The present
value of private and government consumption must equal the present value of wage and
prot income plus the value of initial assets. Since the consumption-income di¤erence is
generally small relative to the government expenditure, a combination of wage subsidy and
a consumption tax results in a very large tax/subsidy rate. A large wage subsidy is not
good since it provides strong incentives to misreport the hours worked. In addition, a large
consumption tax rate may well lead to unreported barters.
2This is based on the 1947-2006 quarterly series of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Personal Consump-
tion Expenditure (PCEC), Government Expenditures (GCE) and Wages and Salary Accruals (WASCUR),
from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Data-FREDII.
1
The government can implement the rst best policy as in Judd (1997) and Guo and
Lansing (1999) by setting the consumption tax rate equal to zero only if it can implement
a lump sum tax (or an equivalent). If there is no lump sum tax, the government faces the
second best problem, and cannot set the consumption tax rate equal to zero. In this paper
we consider a model where lump sum taxes or any equivalent of a lump sum tax are not
available and the government cannot use a wage subsidy in the imperfectly competitive
sector. We show that the second best policy in such a setting involves a zero labour income
tax in the imperfectly competitive sector. This policy is optimal because it minimizes the
incentive to misreport working hours, which in turns brings the working hours back to the
socially optimal level3.
2 The Decentralized Economy
There are two production sectors: sector y (the competitive sector) produces nal goods
(the numeraire), and sector z (the monopoly sector) produces a continuum of intermediate
goods. The technologies are:
yt =
(Z 1
0
z1 jt dj
 1
1 
)
n1 yt ;  2 (0; 1) ; 2 (0; 1) (1)
zjt = k

jtn
1 
zjt ; 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where n is working time, k is capital and zj is the level of intermediate good j 2
[0; 1]. Let pj denote the relative price of intermediate good j. Firms in the monopoly
sector exploit the demand for intermediate goods and make positive economic prots
. In a symmetric equilibrium, intermediate goods price, prots, and factor incomes
are pt =  (yt)
1  1 
 z t (nyt)
(1 )(1 )
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)  (1  ) yt; and rtkt =  (1  ) yt. The economys resource constraint is:
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zt n
1 
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3Our study is also motivated by Coleman II (2000), who construct an optimal taxation problem in a
perfectly competitive economy, and show that the US economy could attain maximum welfare gains from
switching to Ramsey policy if the government is prohibited to use wage subsidy.
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where ct is private consumption, and gt = g > 0 is exogenously given government
expenditure. The governments budget constraints (with symmetry) is:
0 =  ctct + ytwytnyt +  ztwztnzt + kt (rtkt + t) +R
 1
t bt+1   bt   gt (4)
where the tax rates are kt; kt;  ct;  st; s 2 fy; zg, for capital income, prots (with
 2 [0; 1]), private consumption and labour income, respectively, and Rt is rate of return
on bonds bt.
The households derive utility from consumption and leisure, and their utility maxi-
mization problem is:
max
fct;nyt;nzt;kt+1;bt+1g
1X
t=0
tu (ct; 1  nyt   nzt)
s:t:
0 = (1  yt)wytnyt + (1   zt)wztnzt + [(1  kt) rt + 1  ] kt + bt + (1  kt)t
  (1 +  ct) ct   kt+1  R 1t bt+1 (5)
where  2 (0; 1), and u (:) satises standard regularity assumptions. With t 
(1 +  ct)
 1, the symmetric equilibrium conditions are (3), (4), transversality conditions,
prices and prot, and
 uns (t) = uc (t) t (1   st)wst; s 2 fy; zg (6)
uc (t) t+1
uc (t+ 1) t
= Rt =  [(1  kt+1) rt+1 + 1  ] (7)
With er  (1  k) r and fwz  (1   z)wz, in the symmetric equilibrium cost of capital
and labour in the monopoly sector are given by er = (1  ) (1  k)MPk and fwz =
(1  ) (1   z)MPnz. In order to push the private return to these factors up to their
socially optimal levels, the rst best policy should subsidize these income and use a lump
sum tax to raise the revenue required to nance the government expenditure and the
subsidies.
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However, with consumption taxation in the scheme the rst best policy that repli-
cates the socially optimal outcome would actually overcompensate labour income in the
monopoly sector4. If the government can use a lump sum tax, the policy that generates
the rst best outcome includes a large lump sum tax,  c =  ; y =   ;  z =  (+)1  and
k =
 
1  . The rst best capital subsidy pushes up the private return to capital such thater = MPk; but if  > 0, the wage subsidy in the monopoly sector is higher than what is
required to push the private return up to the socially optimal return, i.e. with this subsidy
in the scheme, wage in the monopoly sector is overcompensated.
3 The Ramsey Problem
Our assumption that lump sum taxes are not available motivates the standard optimal tax-
ation problem, which we characterize as the Ramsey (1927) problem. We use the primal
approach to derive the conditions that characterize the Ramsey allocation. Then we look for
the taxes that can implement the second-best wedges. Given the current framework, in the
standard Ramsey problem the government chooses the allocation fct; nyt; nzt; kt+1; bt+1g1t=0
that maximizes welfare subject to the resource constraint (3), and an implementability con-
straint that ensures that the resulting taxes, allocations and prices are consistent with the
decentralized equilibrium. The implementability constraint corresponding to the current
model is:
0 =
1X
t=0
t [uc (t) ct + uny (t)nyt + unz (t)nzt   uc (t) t (1  kt)t]
 
 (c0; ny0; nz0; k0; 0) (8)
where using (6), (7) and equilibrium prices and prots,
(1  kt)t =
(
 (1  ) k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(1 )
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i
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for t  1
for t = 0
)
(9)
4The socially optimal outcome is a solution to the planners problem of choosing allocations to maximize
welfare subject to (3). The rst best policy is the policy that replicates the socially optimal allocations in
the current setting.
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and, 
 (c0; ny0; nz0; k0; 0)  uc (0) 0
hn
(1  k0) (1  ) y0k0 + 1  
o
k0 + b0
i
.
Since we assume that the government faces a restriction in using wage subsidy in the
monopoly sector, we add a non-negative wage taxation constraint to the Ramsey problem.
Substituting for equilbirium wage in (6) for the monopoly sector, we derive the constraint
that characterizes non-negative wage taxation in the monopoly sector:
0  t (1  )  (1  ) kt n(1 ) 1zt n1 yt +
unz (t)
uc (t)
(10)
For xed gt, k0,  c0, k0 > 0, and b0; the Ramsey problem is the governments problem
of choosing allocations and ftg1t=1 that maximizes welfare subject to constraints (3), (8),
(9) and (10). Let   0, ftg1t=0 and ftg1t=0 denote the multipliers for (8) (with (9)), (3)
and (10), respectively, and denote the Pseudo utility function as G (ct; nyt; nzt; kt; t; ),
such that
G (:)  u (ct; 1  nyt   nzt) +  [uc (t) ct + uny (t)nyt + unz (t)nzt   uc (t) t (1  kt)t]
where (1  kt)t is given by (9).
Assume that the instantanous utility is separable in consumption and labour and linear
in labour. The rst order conditions for t  1 corresponding to the Ramsey problem are:
0 = Gc (t)  t   t
unz (t)ucc (t)
fuc (t)g2
(11a)
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t n(1 ) 1zt n1 yt

t + tt
(1  ) [ (1  )  1]
nzt

(11c)
0 = t   
24 Gk (t+ 1) + t+1
n
k 1t+1 n
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1 
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o
+
t+1t+1
(1 )(1 )2k 1t+1 n(1 )zt+1 n1 yt+1
nzt+1
35 (11d)
0 = G (t) + t (1  ) (1  ) kt n(1 ) 1zt n1 yt (11e)
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and the Kuhn-Tucker condition is:
t (1  )  (1  ) kt n(1 ) 1zt n1 yt +
unz (t)
uc (t)
 0; with equality if t > 0 (12)
which, together with (8), (9),(3) for all t and the rst order conditions for t = 0
characterize the Ramsey equilibrium. Notice that the derivative of the Pseudo utility
function with respect to t is:
G (t) =  
"
(1  kt)tuc (t)+
tuc (t)

(1 )
n
kt 1
uc(t 2)
uc(t 1)t   kt
uc(t 1)t 1
uc(t)(t)
2
o # (13)
where (1  kt)t is given by (9). In a steady state, (13) and (11e) together imply:
0 =  [(1  k)uc]   (1  )  (1  ) kn(1 ) 1z n1 y (14)
Proposition 1 In an imperfectly competitive economy, if the government is not permitted
to subsidize wage in the imperfectly competitive sector, in period 0 and in a steady state
the optimal labour income tax in the imperfectly competitive sector is zero.
Proof. Consider (14), which implies  > 0. Thus in a steady state the non-negativity
constraint (10) is satised with equality, and  z = 0. The rst order condition to the
Ramsey problem with respect to 0 is:
0 =   (1  k0)0uc (0) + 0 (1  )  (1  ) k0 n(1 ) 1z0 n1 y0   R0k0uc (0) (15)
which implies 0 > 0, i.e. at t = 0 the non-negativity constraint (10) is satised with
equality, and  z0 = 0.
The transition to this steady state is however not necessarily characterized by t > 0
for all t  1. Although 0 > 0 and  > 0, starting at t = 1 many paths of tax rates
can achieve  z = 0 and all these paths may be consistent with the equilibrium behavior
of tax payers at the optimal allocations. Some of these paths may have  zt > 0 along the
transition, which is explained by the term
n
kt 1
uc(t 2)
uc(t 1)t   kt
uc(t 1)t 1
uc(t)(t)
2
o
in (13).
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4 Concluding Remarks
In an imperfectly competitive economy, over accumulation of capital induces signicant
loss in welfare (because of prot seeking motive), but more capital per worker increases
the real wage. Since the rst best tax policy involves a subsidy to wage, with consumption
taxation in the scheme the large subsidy rate overcompensates labour income and provides
incentives to misreport working hours. We show that with a restriction on the use of wage
subsidy, the governments optimal choice is to set wage tax equal to zero in the long run
and in the initial period which minimizes the incentive to misreport working hours.
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